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Executing SC in the combat environment of the GWOT calls for tasks and results at the operational and tactical levels. As a successful counterinsurgency engages the local populace to surround and outnumber insurgents, so must SC move from constricted planning and engagement by a minimal PA force to using every soldier to create entry points into the social network of the undecided Muslim majority. Communications require synchronization and deconfliction like operational fires and effects. As with any tactical engagement, messages must be aimed and fired by trained soldiers who understand their orders, and not individually aimed from a headquarters outside the AOR. These SC fire elements should work in a combined arms fashion, coordinating with PA elements at the Brigade and Corps to expand and direct dissemination and seize strategic communication decisive points that contribute to the overall campaign. In short, success in this endeavor demands a modification of mission type orders at the Corps through brigade combat team (BCT) level (not just words in an OPLAN), and the organizational, training, and equipment changes required to institutionalize the change.
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Audience and Terms
A comprehensive study of the global SC environment involves too many variables to illustrate an argument; consequently, GWOT and the OIF counterinsurgency fight offer a more manageable frame of reference. For simplicity, this paper considers combat operations rather than include phase 0 and phase 4. Additionally, to limit the scope of discussion, this paper recognizes the natural function of a division HQ as a synchronizer and aggregator, but deals directly with the Corps and the BCT.
For SC success, PA staff and information operations planners must work even more closely to develop roles and responsibilities that accomplish the mission without infringing on the equities of each community (i.e. information operations cannot be legally conducted against US persons and PA communications must remain truthful). Planners at the Corps and BCT should familiarize themselves with the solutions outlined below in order to arm themselves with the widest array of tools possible to develop SC products and train their forces.
The foundation for such a discussion lies in standard terms of reference. JP 5-0 defines strategic communication as, "Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. 2 should comb friendly and adversary media to identify and connect information that reinforces SC themes. The commander then emphasizes these elements through active SC. In this manner, PA organizations and individual soldiers provide truthful information and action while interagency and PSYOP personnel determine the most influential themes for in country and external audiences. 
Organizational Inertia
Solutions
Objectives
The first step to developing an operational solution requires the Army to develop a GWOT centered objective that links service imperatives to USG SC priorities. This linkage ties Army efforts to Mr. Rendon's "authoritative source" above. In this manner, component commands can plan and execute operations in lock step with the combatant command's interagency efforts and executive branch strategic guidance, see Table 3 below.
Organizational Framework
The next step requires building a framework that translates the operational guidance above into action. While Perkins and Scott from the Joint Information Operations Center recommended mission type orders as a method for guiding combatant commands planning, they only described the "what" as targeting/themes/and timelines. They but avoided a discussion of "how" subordinate unit might formulate operations 13 Such examples are critical to fulfilling the service considerations, and coordinating instructions for multiple subordinate units to ensure the linkage developed in the previous paragraph evolves into actionable procedures in the field.
To build the framework the Corps must establish focus, define personnel roles and responsibilities, and execute those roles and responsibilities via the same fragmentary order that executes combat forces, not a "stove pipe" guidance that only addresses public affairs or What causes such a disparity? Locally, how are themes interpreted by the BCT staff and subsequently by local leadership? Second, when the commander notes a broad trend, he must act quickly and increase priority of effort for subordinate units, interagency and liaison officers in order to reverse the negative momentum in the "Extremism Endangers Families" theme. Finally, the commander must choose how to react to "Self Governance." Since the problem crosses just one Division boundary, the possibility of a thematic or presentation problem like the one just discussed seems lower than likelihood of an operational issue (such as competition between local leaders or a local struggle not aligned with the way US commanders partition command responsibility).
Figure 1 Notional Corps-level SC Mosaic
At the tactical level, the BCT commander receives mission type orders and focuses on translating intent and themes into locally relevant tactical messages that communicate SC themes inside his combat zone. Some messages may be active, meaning that the BCT commander and his key officers engage the populace and the media directly. But the majority of SC will likely be passive, meaning unit and soldier actions re-affirm SC themes, either verbally, through interaction, or even by passing out something like a story/poster/or sticker 15 . While active tasks are best suited to leadership, junior troops who have the widest contact with the host nation population offer the best opportunity to continuously and repetitively engage.
Roles and Responsibilities
A complete solution must look inside the Corps and BCT organizations to define roles and responsibilities. As described in the previous section, PA and PSYOP provide the primary conferences. 16 Regardless of command echelon, as today's near real-time battle space shifts away from print media, the replacement of certain print and TV mission essential tasks with social networking and internet media tasks seems most applicable for the journalist and broadcast journalist specialties.
To capitalize on improved task organization, SC must convey supporting themes to the maximum audience, especially the passive majority, in minimum time. This means "targeting" the right audiences through the largest relevant array of media. Current Army PA doctrine identifies a gap in "targeting" media messages. FM 3-61 states, "Information Strategies (sic) is the sum of all actions and activities, which contribute to informing the American public and the Army," 17 By focusing on the American public and the Army, current information strategy doesn't attempt to communicate even basic news to adversary and "undecided" consumers. Tables 1 and 2 below discuss a division of responsibilities for PA and PSYOP, and focus areas to close the targeting gap by addressing in country and broader international audiences. Similarly, PSYOP planners must maximize the operational reach of SC. They accomplish this by defining the cultural profile, or audience analysis, of different leadership and minority groups from the local to the international level, then synchronizing the targeting of specific messages to specific groups. This includes a prediction of adversary media capability and dissemination paths, so US forces can directly engage or flank those local and international dissemination paths with SC as an integral part of the operation.
PA
The PSYOP/IO Media Presence and Public Opinion tasks in Table 3 work together.
They assume that PA analysis has already identified avenues to saturate the information environment with relevant thematic content. In turn, the commander or his staff may plan to cite and link PA content through additional news releases, social networking to local leaders, blogs, With a framework for focus areas, roles, and responsibilities established, the mission type order provides the cornerstone for executing successful SC across the Corps and in sync with higher headquarters and external agencies. Planners should focus on the situation and execution sections, addressing other sections as required.
Mission Type Order SC Considerations
Joint Intelligence of the Operational Environment forms the basis for strategic communication targeting. When analyzing enemy forces in the situation section, kinetic requirements will likely have prompted intelligence providers to identify friendly personnel as well as opposition groups. However, intelligence agencies may not map the SC inputs and outputs of those groups unless prompted.
Since the silent majority controls a key capability to sway or neutralize adversary influence and behavior, in a "hearts and minds" battle, the situation must also include a section for international/global audiences. At a minimum, SC analysis should define the key drivers and between land operations that traverse public lands or property in foreign territories for the purpose of achieving US political objectives, and using public or commercial sites in the information domain to achieve US political objectives. As with any electronic communication, cyber security concerns apply; however, to contend for the information domain, the Army must occupy the territory of that domain.
Requiring information collection and dissemination within a timeframe of hours, in a complex risk environment, may necessitate reorganization. Corps and BCT commanders must seriously challenge the idea separating PSYOP and PA in their own decision processes. The very act of "telling the story" imparts a perspective. Any perspective not shared by all readers contains some amount of bias, so why constrain our SC with unrealistic fear of collateral damage and subsequent expectations we wouldn't place on any other MOS? If the goal is delivering truthful information to the right audience via the right mechanism, how can a commander mitigate risk without expert cultural advice? When is it better to not attack a suicide bomber because he's in a crowd of people, vice letting him hit the detonator and take out innocent civilians with him? The PSYOP thin slicer offers a critical combat multiplier, an essential tool to help commanders emphasize the right messages with the right audiences at the right time to amplify our actions and present a unified and authoritative national message.
SC can be visualized as a volleyball match. The US/coalition side has information that will affect the outcome of the game. Players in each row represent different Army echelons, coalition liaison officers, and/or interagency staff. SC offers the opportunity to move critical information from our side to the other side of the net. A "spike" helps, but isn't necessary to score. If SC from a rear echelon resonates with the adversary and scores a point, great; otherwise, our front line is there to spike the ball at the right time and place, or to defend the net if the adversary takes a shot at the information we provided. Volleys aren't always short and sweet. Sometimes the best defense US/coalition forces can muster will be a dig to keep the volley going. The important point is to keep moving our information to the other side of the net to maximize our opportunity to spike and score. Individual combat soldiers need to develop strategic communication "mindedness".
Professional military education must go beyond teaching soldiers to respond to interviews. The orders discussed in this paper show the linkage between USG strategic intent and tactical ops.
Tactical leaders need to practice identifying which of their planned actions has positive strategic communication value and which of their risks could cause a SC problem. BCTs should provide a standard decision aid, or pneumonic that helps soldiers reinforce the right themes under stress, such a pneumonic can be changed with each operation or may become a standard for operations 22 with that AO. The SOF mantra "behind, with, through" provides a solid example of how to frame actions and remarks during and following operations. Information collection capabilities at the tactical level must be seamless and simple because soldiers don't have time or energy to worry about one more piece of gear.
As the previous paragraph points out, information collection capabilities must be seamless. SC requires few additional resources, but planners should investigate the utility of inexpensive (less than $300) lightweight (less than 1lb) commercial-off-the-shelf "helmet cameras" for all (not just some) fielded forces. All are designed to work with computer and video equipment. Several are designed for motocross, mountain biking, and rainy environments. If the adversary always plans to exploit the information domain, then relying on the chance opportunity of an embedded reporter or a supportive local with a camera phone constitutes unnecessary operational risk. Personnel security offers an obvious counterpoint to the "helmet cam"
argument, but security concerns are easy to overturn. Once engaged by the enemy, friendly troop positions and movements are known. Video offers an additional source of intelligence for analyzing adversary actions that may go unnoticed during the heat of battle. Personal video offers a proven way to document performance and improve TTP in everything from professional sports to air combat.
An "always on" video system frees the soldier to engage the enemy without having to think about finding media to exploit the SC value of the event. Soldiers understand that war is ugly, and that graphic images are likely to alienate more than they help. For this reason, the Army should work with Air Force weapon system video experts (from precision bombs) to determine the best compromise between finding the right information on the tape and eliminating the fear of "big brother" waiting to discipline a soldier for wartime transgressions. To be fair, early notification of potential misconduct allows the Army to take the moral high ground before the enemy can exploit a situation and the soldier's profession assumes the highest moral standards. At times, especially early, our soldiers may falter, but they will not fail.
Strategic communication places few requirements on logistics, personnel, and facilities.
Since SC constitutes a capability within existing operational units, logistical requirements may actually decrease as reliance on traditional media decreases. SC tasks call for a change in personnel use rather than an increased number of personnel. Foundational training schools may require additional time to teach specific technical skills related to new media, but personnel quotas shouldn't change.
Conclusion
In the strategic communications arena, the US Army faces a peer competitor equal to or better than any in her history. In spite of this, we continue to target only a small portion of the global audience we claim will decide the war. We further limit ourselves by overlooking common litmus tests we apply to things like command relationships: "Who has the preponderance of the combat force, and the capability to command and control the force? Will that organization employ the entire force 100% of the time, or dedicate forces to other missions and commanders?" The logical answer for this mission set is the Army, yet the service remains trapped in an institutional chrysalis rather than creating the guidance units need to emerge with a fuller spectrum SC capability.
Such a transformation requires Army leadership to refocus the service. Linking service objectives provide the bridge between national policy and combat action, but warfighting Corps must also reshape their organizations by focusing on the different tasks affecting the different echelons of their command. Broad reaching changes include: redefining roles and responsibilities 24 and insisting on more complementary efforts between PA and PSYOP forces, developing expert PSYOP cultural "thin-slicers" with a perception/reaction mindset, cultivation of indirect SC fires, and (most critically) synchronizing SC with every aspect of every operation by improving mission type orders.
Of course the Army retains service responsibilities. To evolve, the Army must develop new constructs for training strategic decision makers, electronic journalists, and front line communicators. To feed the fight, the Army must search out not only new methods for dissemination, but new means for collecting front line information, soldier mounted cameras are just one option for beating the insurgent in the information race. To synchronize these complex effects, the Army should look to the resident expertise, fires personnel, to provide operational rigor in terms of weapons (different media), targets and timing, and deconfliction (within an echelon and across echelons. All the preceding changes will be slower without improvements to both Army and Joint Doctrine.
When mission type orders help individual soldiers understand how their actions and words shape the strategic fight, BCTs will succeed in their missions; host nations experience better security, economic freedom, and self-governance. The host nation and international governments will expand their network of influence with local and international peers as well as political and religious leaders. The actions of our friends and our common enemies will determine our SC success. 
